! A FLAWED DEAL keeping Iran only one year away from achieving breakout capabilities, the window within which the international community could act in the event of an Iranian breach is extremely narrow. As such, a breach would need be known well in advance for there to be time for international powers to act. Accordingly, it is essential that an agreement of this kind sets in place a rigorous and robust inspection regime that would not allow for scenarios in which Iran could break the agreement without the knowledge of international observers. Under the terms of the agreement, international inspectors from the IAEA are granted extensive access to Iran’s declared nuclear sites, with the agreement allowing for 24-hour surveillance of Iran’s known nuclear infrastructure. However, it was also anticipated that inspections would go much further. Given that Iran had previously concealed nuclear facilities at secret sites, it was widely believed that monitors would be permitted the freedom to carry out inspections anywhere in the country. Specifically, there was an emphasis placed on granting inspectors access to Iranian military sites--with French diplomats particularly insisting on this point—on account of the fact that it is the possible military dimension of the Iranian nuclear programme that has always caused the greatest international concern. Additionally, it was recommended that for the inspections regime to be robust, it would have to allow for inspectors to conduct unannounced and surprise visits to sites so as to ensure that Iran was not concealing or transferring prohibited material and apparatus from sites where inspections were scheduled in advance. Out of these expectations emerged the commonly used phrase “anytime, anywhere inspections.” Following the release of the framework agreement in early April 2015, Obama administration spokespeople and advisors had assured that a final agreement would include provisions for “anytime, anywhere 24/7” access. However, the administration has explicitly denied that it ever sought “anytime, anywhere” inspections, and that it instead favoured “managed access.” Indeed, the US government subsequently celebrated having been able to secure inspections “where necessary, when necessary.” At the time of announcement that the agreement had been signed, US officials outlined that the terms of the deal would allow for international inspectors to be guaranteed access to Iranian military facilities within 24 days of requesting to visit a particular site – a period of time that was viewed by critics of the agreement as a fundamental flaw. Indeed, the concern here is that this arrangement would allow Iran a number of weeks in which to cover up any prohibited activities at military sites. However, a more careful reading of the details set out in the agreement reveals that the period of time that Iran would have to potentially conceal a breach of the agreement would be significantly longer than 24 days. Under the terms of the Vienna agreement, if inspectors wish to be granted access to Iranian military sites, then they must first undergo a drawn out and complicated series of consultations that may not necessarily even guarantee being admitted to that site by the end of that process. The terms of the International Joint Plan of Action concerning suspected, but as yet undeclared, nuclear sites obliges IAEA inspectors to first submit an outline justifying the grounds for their concern. Presenting this request in no way obliges Iran to grant access to the sites of concern but rather Iran would simply be expected to respond with an explanation addressing inspectors’ concerns. If the IAEA finds the Iranian explanation unsatisfactory, only then can a process begin 4 ! !