AN ENDURING THREAT: EUROPE’S ISLAMIST TERROR NETWORKS THEN AND NOW 4. Improve efforts to challenge prison radicalisation and develop more effective policy to prevent ! offenders being drawn into terrorism; One of the most prominent details identified by this report to occur in the biographical data of members of both the old al-Qaeda-linked networks and the new IS-affiliated networks is a history of petty crime. The data also highlights that in many cases, particularly with regard to those involved in the attacks on Paris and Brussels, the only contact between the authorities and those who would go on to be involved in terrorism was in relation to this petty crime rather than terrorism offences or known links to extremist groups. While this factor provides an important insight which must be taken into account if European policy-makers and security services are to learn the lessons highlighted by both networks profiled, working out how to do so is extremely difficult. Any policy developed to try and identify those petty criminals which may be most vulnerable risks Muslim offenders being targeted in a discriminatory manner. However, it is possible to include those most likely to come into contact with those arrested and convicted of petty crimes of specified authorities in any legislative efforts to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. In the UK, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA) mandates these specified 1365 authorities to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. In practice, this means these authorities must be able to “demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body”, ensure “staff understand the risk and build the capabilities to deal with it” and “understand how to obtain support for people who may be being exploited 1366 by radicalising influences”. The CTSA includes a number of specified authorities where staff are likely to come into contact with those involved in petty crime, including police forces, prisons and young offender institutions, providers of probation services, and local authorities responsible for providing pastoral care facilities for vulnerable individuals. Ensuring these authorities focus on the prevalence of petty crime in the backgrounds of terrorists when training staff could lead to a greater awareness of the risks across these sectors. It is also vital that prison services across Europe take the threat of radicalisation within their establishments more seriously. It is almost inconceivable that a man as important to so many terrorist networks across Europe as Djamel Beghal was free to radicalise Cherif Kouachi, who would go on to kill 12 people alongside his brother during their attack on the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices, while the two men were 1367 in prison together from January 2005 to October 2006. Beghal was also able to meet the Hypercache 1368 shooter Ahmedy Coulibaly in prison between January and August 2005, with Coulibaly later visiting him at his home before being convicted alongside him. In addition, Abdelhamid Abaaoud is also believed to have become involved with extremists while in prison, as is Salim Benghalem – who would later become involved in the same militant network as Beghal and eventually rise to become an IS “theatre 1369 commander”. Both Mehdi Nemmouche and Mohammed Merah have also been named as men 1370 radicalised during their time in prison for petty crimes. In the UK meanwhile, the Prison Officers ! ! 1365 ‘Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015’, HM Government, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/section/26/enacted, last visited: 9 August 2016. 1366‘Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales’, HM Government, 16 July 2015, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2- Interactive.pdf, last visited: 9 August 2016. 1367 Rayner, G. and David Barrett, ‘Charlie Hebdo suspect 'mentored' by Abu Hamza disciple’, The Telegraph, 8 January 2015. 1368 ‘French attacks inquiry centers on prison 'sorcerer' Beghal’, Reuters, 15 January 2015. 1369 Van Vlierden, G., ‘The Zerkani Network: Belgium’s Most Dangerous Jihadist Group’, The Jamestown Foundation, 12 April 2016. 1370 ‘Are French prisons ‘finishing schools’ for terrorism’, Guardian, 17 March 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/are-french- prisons-finishing-schools-for-terrorism, last visited: 9 August 2016. ! ! 111 !